Integrating Contact Tracers Into Point-of-Care Testing Workflow to Accelerate the Tracing of People With Exposure to COVID-19, August-December 2020, New York City.

OBJECTIVES: We assessed the timeliness of contact tracing following rapid-positive COVID-19 test result at point-of-care testing (POCT) sites in New York City (NYC). DESIGN: Interviewed case-patients to elicit exposed contacts and conducted COVID-19 exposure notifications. SETTINGS: Twenty-two COVID-19 POCT sites in NYC, the 2 NYC international airports, and 1 ferry terminal. PARTICIPANTS: Case-patients with rapid-positive COVID-19 test results and their named contacts. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: We quantified the proportions of interviewed individuals with COVID-19 and notified contacts and assessed the timeliness between the dates of the rapid-positive COVID-19 test results and the interviews or notifications. RESULTS: In total, 11 683 individuals with rapid-positive COVID-19 test results were referred for contact tracing on the day of their diagnosis; 8878 (76) of whom were interviewed within 1 day of diagnosis, of whom 5499 (62%) named 11 486 contacts. A median of 1.24 contacts were identified from each interview. The odds of eliciting contacts were significantly higher among individuals reporting COVID-19 symptoms than among persons with no symptoms (51% vs 36%; adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 1.37; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.11-1.70) or living with 1 or more persons than living alone (89% vs 38%; aOR = 12.11; 95% CI, 10.73-13.68). Among the 8878 interviewed case-patients, 8317 (94%) were interviewed within 1 day of their rapid-positive COVID-19 test results and 91% of contact notifications were completed within 1 day of contact identification. The median interval from test result to interview date and from case investigation interview to contact notification were both 0 days (IQR = 0). CONCLUSIONS: The integration of contact tracers into COVID-19 POCT workflow achieved timely case investigation and contact notification. Accelerated contact tracing can be used to curb COVID-19 transmission during local outbreaks.

Pfizer-BioNTech Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccine Effectiveness Against Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Infection Among Long-term Care Facility Staff With and Without Prior Infection in New York City, January-June 2021.

BACKGROUND: Evidence is accumulating of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccine effectiveness among persons with prior severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection. METHODS: We evaluated the effect against incident SARS-CoV-2 infection of (1) prior infection without vaccination, (2) vaccination (2 doses of Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine) without prior infection, and (3) vaccination after prior infection, all compared with unvaccinated persons without prior infection. We included long-term care facility staff in New York City aged <65 years with weekly SARS-CoV-2 testing from 21 January to 5 June 2021. Test results were obtained from state-mandated laboratory reporting. Vaccination status was obtained from the Citywide Immunization Registry. Cox proportional hazards models adjusted for confounding with inverse probability of treatment weights. RESULTS: Compared with unvaccinated persons without prior infection, incident SARS-CoV-2 infection risk was lower in all groups: 54.6% (95% confidence interval, 38.0%-66.8%) lower among unvaccinated, previously infected persons; 80.0% (67.6%-87.7%) lower among fully vaccinated persons without prior infection; and 82.4% (70.8%-89.3%) lower among persons fully vaccinated after prior infection. CONCLUSIONS: Two doses of Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine reduced SARS-CoV-2 infection risk by ≥80% and, for those with prior infection, increased protection from prior infection alone. These findings support recommendations that all eligible persons, regardless of prior infection, be vaccinated against COVID-19.

Faith Community Engagement to Mitigate COVID-19 Transmission Associated with Mass Gathering, Uman, Ukraine, September 2021.

Annually, ≈30,000 Hasidic and Orthodox Jews travel to Uman, Ukraine, during the Jewish New Year to pray at the burial place of the founder of the Breslov Hasidic movement. Many pilgrims come from the northeastern United States. The global health implications of this event were seen in 2019 when measles outbreaks in the United States and Israel were linked to the pilgrimage. The 2020 pilgrimage was cancelled as part of the COVID-19 travel restrictions imposed by the government of Ukraine. To prepare for the 2021 event, the National Public Health Institute, the Public Health Center of Ukraine, organized mitigation measures for pilgrims arriving in Uman, and the CDC COVID-19 International Task Force assisted with mitigation measures for pilgrims coming from the United States. We describe efforts to support COVID-19 mitigation measures before, during, and after this mass gathering and lessons learned for future mass gatherings during pandemics.

COVID-19 Case Investigation and Contact Tracing in New York City, June 1, 2020, to October 31, 2021.

Importance: Contact tracing is a core strategy for preventing the spread of many infectious diseases of public health concern. Better understanding of the outcomes of contact tracing for COVID-19 as well as the operational opportunities and challenges in establishing a program for a jurisdiction as large as New York City (NYC) is important for the evaluation of this strategy. Objective: To describe the establishment, scaling, and maintenance of Trace, NYC's contact tracing program, and share data on outcomes during its first 17 months. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study included people with laboratory test-confirmed and probable COVID-19 and their contacts in NYC between June 1, 2020, and October 31, 2021. Trace launched on June 1, 2020, and had a workforce of 4147 contact tracers, with the majority of the workforce performing their jobs completely remotely. Data were analyzed in March 2022. Main Outcomes and Measures: Number and proportion of persons with COVID-19 and contacts on whom investigations were attempted and completed; timeliness of interviews relative to symptom onset or exposure for symptomatic cases and contacts, respectively. Results: Case investigations were attempted for 941 035 persons. Of those, 840 922 (89.4%) were reached and 711 353 (75.6%) completed an intake interview (women and girls, 358 775 [50.4%]; 60 178 [8.5%] Asian, 110 636 [15.6%] Black, 210 489 [28.3%] Hispanic or Latino, 157 349 [22.1%] White). Interviews were attempted for 1 218 650 contacts. Of those, 904 927 (74.3%) were reached, and 590 333 (48.4%) completed intake (women and girls, 219 261 [37.2%]; 47 403 [8.0%] Asian, 98 916 [16.8%] Black, 177 600 [30.1%] Hispanic or Latino, 116 559 [19.7%] White). Completion rates were consistent over time and resistant to changes related to vaccination as well as isolation and quarantine guidance. Among symptomatic cases, median time from symptom onset to intake completion was 4.7 days; a median 1.4 contacts were identified per case. Median time from contacts' last date of exposure to intake completion was 2.3 days. Among contacts, 30.1% were tested within 14 days of notification. Among cases, 27.8% were known to Trace as contacts. The overall expense for Trace from May 6, 2020, through October 31, 2021, was approximately $600 million. Conclusions and Relevance: Despite the complexity of developing a contact tracing program in a diverse city with a population of over 8 million people, in this case study we were able to identify 1.4 contacts per case and offer resources to safely isolate and quarantine to over 1 million cases and contacts in this study period.

Contact tracing reveals community transmission of COVID-19 in New York City.

Understanding SARS-CoV-2 transmission within and among communities is critical for tailoring public health policies to local context. However, analysis of community transmission is challenging due to a lack of high-resolution surveillance and testing data. Here, using contact tracing records for 644,029 cases and their contacts in New York City during the second pandemic wave, we provide a detailed characterization of the operational performance of contact tracing and reconstruct exposure and transmission networks at individual and ZIP code scales. We find considerable heterogeneity in reported close contacts and secondary infections and evidence of extensive transmission across ZIP code areas. Our analysis reveals the spatial pattern of SARS-CoV-2 spread and communities that are tightly interconnected by exposure and transmission. We find that locations with higher vaccination coverage and lower numbers of visitors to points-of-interest had reduced within- and cross-ZIP code transmission events, highlighting potential measures for curtailing SARS-CoV-2 spread in urban settings.

Outcomes of a Community Engagement and Information Gathering Program to Support Telephone-Based COVID-19 Contact Tracing: Descriptive Analysis.

BACKGROUND: Contact tracing is an important public health tool for curbing the spread of infectious diseases. Effective and efficient contact tracing involves the rapid identification of individuals with infection and their exposed contacts and ensuring their isolation or quarantine, respectively. Manual contact tracing via telephone call and digital proximity app technology have been key strategies in mitigating the spread of COVID-19. However, many people are not reached for COVID-19 contact tracing due to missing telephone numbers or nonresponse to telephone calls. The New York City COVID-19 Trace program augmented the efforts of telephone-based contact tracers with information gatherers (IGs) to search and obtain telephone numbers or residential addresses, and community engagement specialists (CESs) made home visits to individuals that were not contacted via telephone calls. OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study was to assess the contribution of information gathering and home visits to the yields of COVID-19 contact tracing in New York City. METHODS: IGs looked for phone numbers or addresses when records were missing phone numbers to locate case-patients or contacts. CESs made home visits to case-patients and contacts with no phone numbers or those who were not reached by telephone-based tracers. Contact tracing management software was used to triage and queue assignments for the telephone-based tracers, IGs, and CESs. We measured the outcomes of contact tracing-related tasks performed by the IGs and CESs from July 2020 to June 2021. RESULTS: Of 659,484 cases and 861,566 contact records in the Trace system, 28% (185,485) of cases and 35% (303,550) of contacts were referred to IGs. IGs obtained new phone numbers for 33% (61,804) of case-patients and 11% (31,951) of contacts; 50% (31,019) of the case-patients and 46% (14,604) of the contacts with new phone numbers completed interviews; 25% (167,815) of case-patients and 8% (72,437) of contacts were referred to CESs. CESs attempted 80% (132,781) of case and 69% (49,846) of contact investigations, of which 47% (62,733) and 50% (25,015) respectively, completed interviews. An additional 12,192 contacts were identified following IG investigations and 13,507 following CES interventions. CONCLUSIONS: Gathering new or missing locating information and making home visits increased the number of case-patients and contacts interviewed for contact tracing and resulted in additional contacts. When possible, contact tracing programs should add information gathering and home visiting strategies to increase COVID-19 contact tracing coverage and yields as well as promote equity in the delivery of this public health intervention.

Community-Based Workforce for COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Prevention Activities in New York City, July-December 2020.

OBJECTIVES: High rates of hospitalization and death disproportionately affected Black, Latino, and Asian residents of New York City at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. To suppress COVID-19 transmission, New York City implemented a workforce of community engagement specialists (CESs) to conduct home-based contact tracing when telephone numbers were lacking or telephone-based efforts were unsuccessful and to disseminate COVID-19 information and sanitary supplies. MATERIALS AND METHODS: We describe the recruitment, training, and deployment of a multilingual CES workforce with diverse sociodemographic backgrounds during July-December 2020 in New York City. We developed standard operating procedures for infection control and safety measures, procured supplies and means of transportation, and developed protocols and algorithms to efficiently distribute workload. RESULTS: From July through December 2020, 519 CESs were trained to conduct in-person contact tracing and activities in community settings, including homes, schools, and businesses, where they disseminated educational materials, face masks, hand sanitizer, and home-based specimen collection kits. During the study period, 94 704 records of people with COVID-19 and 61 246 contacts not reached by telephone-based contact tracers were referred to CESs. CESs attempted home visits or telephone calls with 84 230 people with COVID-19 and 49 303 contacts, reaching approximately 55 592 (66%) and 35 005 (71%), respectively. Other CES activities included monitoring recently arrived travelers under quarantine, eliciting contacts at point-of-care testing sites, and advising schools on school-based COVID-19 mitigation strategies. PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS: This diverse CES workforce allowed for safe, in-person implementation of contact tracing and other prevention services for individuals and communities impacted by COVID-19. This approach prioritized equitable delivery of community-based support services and resources.

Investigation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Associated With a Large Indoor Convention - New York City, November-December 2021.

During November 19-21, 2021, an indoor convention (event) in New York City (NYC), was attended by approximately 53,000 persons from 52 U.S. jurisdictions and 30 foreign countries. In-person registration for the event began on November 18, 2021. The venue was equipped with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration, and attendees were required to wear a mask indoors and have documented receipt of at least 1 dose of a COVID-19 vaccine.* On December 2, 2021, the Minnesota Department of Health reported the first case of community-acquired COVID-19 in the United States caused by the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant in a person who had attended the event (1). CDC collaborated with state and local health departments to assess event-associated COVID-19 cases and potential exposures among U.S.-based attendees using data from COVID-19 surveillance systems and an anonymous online attendee survey. Among 34,541 attendees with available contact information, surveillance data identified test results for 4,560, including 119 (2.6%) persons from 16 jurisdictions with positive SARS-CoV-2 test results. Most (4,041 [95.2%]), survey respondents reported always wearing a mask while indoors at the event. Compared with test-negative respondents, test-positive respondents were more likely to report attending bars, karaoke, or nightclubs, and eating or drinking indoors near others for at least 15 minutes. Among 4,560 attendees who received testing, evidence of widespread transmission during the event was not identified. Genomic sequencing of 20 specimens identified the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant (AY.25 and AY.103 sublineages) in 15 (75%) cases, and the Omicron variant (BA.1 sublineage) in five (25%) cases. These findings reinforce the importance of implementing multiple, simultaneous prevention measures, such as ensuring up-to-date vaccination, mask use, physical distancing, and improved ventilation in limiting SARS-CoV-2 transmission, during large, indoor events.†.